Land & Water Law Review
Volume 31

Issue 2

Article 17

1996

Torts - I May Be Liable but It's Not My Fault: The Wyoming
Supreme Court Rules That Defaulting Defendants Can Now
Challenge Fault - McGarvin-Moberly Const. v. Welden
Timothy M. Stubson

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water

Recommended Citation
Stubson, Timothy M. (1996) "Torts - I May Be Liable but It's Not My Fault: The Wyoming Supreme Court
Rules That Defaulting Defendants Can Now Challenge Fault - McGarvin-Moberly Const. v. Welden," Land &
Water Law Review: Vol. 31 : Iss. 2 , pp. 645 - 661.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol31/iss2/17

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Land & Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship.

Stubson: Torts - I May Be Liable but It's Not My Fault: The Wyoming Suprem

TORTS-I may be liable but it's not my fault!: The Wyoming
Supreme Court rules that defaulting defendants can now
challenge fault. McGarvin-Moberly Const. v. Welden, 897 P.2d
1310 (Wyo. 1995).

Within the patchwork of policies that form our judicial system,
concerns of efficiency often conflict with the nobler concept of justice.
This struggle recently erupted in the case of McGarvin-Moberly Const. v.
Welden,l where the Wyoming Supreme Court addressed comparative
fault's relationship with default.
On May 29, 1992, an automobile accident occurred on U.S. Highway 310 near Lovell, Wyoming.2 An employee of S & L Industrial, a
subcontractor for McGarvin-Moberly Construction, had stopped traffic
along the highway to allow for on-going construction.3 Billy and Josephine Welden occupied the first car stopped by the flagwoman. 4 Two
other cars sat waiting in line behind them.' Before the flagwoman could
give the signal to proceed through the construction area, Mrs. Bertha
Hunter approached the waiting cars from behind and failed to stop. She
slammed into the column of cars, causing a chain reaction which ended
when the second car in line collided with the Weldens' vehicle.6
On January 20, 1993, the Weldens filed a complaint alleging negligence against Bertha Hunter7 and McGarvin-Moberly Construction Company. 8 Mrs. Hunter's estate filed a timely answer. However, McGarvinMoberly failed to respond by the February 18, 1993 deadline, 9 as required by Wyo. R. Civ. P. 12(a).'I The clerk of the district court entered
default against McGarvin-Moberly oil March 3, 1993 pursuant to

1. 897 P.2d 1310 (Wyo. 1995).
2. McGarvin-Moberly Const., 897 P.2d at 1312.
3. Petition for Writ of Review at 2, Welden v. Hunter (Wyo. June 29, 1995) (No. 93-238)
[hereinafter McGarvin-Moberly's Petition].
4. Id.

5. Id.
6. McGarvin-Moberly Const., 897 P.2d at 1312.
7. Mrs. Hunter passed away on January 20, 1993. McGarvin-Moberly's Petition, supra note
3, at 6. The complaint was served on her personal representative, Dan A. Hunter. Id.
8. Welden's Response to MeGarvin-Moberly's Petition for Writ of Review at 8-9. Welden v.
Hunter (Wyo. June 29, 1995) (No. 93-238) [hereinafter Welden's Response].
9. Id.at 9.
10. Wyo. R. Cv. P. 12 states in part, "(a) When presented.- A defendant shall serve an an-

swer within 20 days after the service of the summons and complaint upon that defendant."
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Wyo. R. Civ. P. 55(a)." application for default judgment to the court,
but the court did not immediately rule on it.' 2
On March 19, 1993, one month after the statutory deadline to respond, McGarvin-Moberly filed a motion to set Aside the entry of default, and an answer to the plaintiffs complaint. t3 The district court refused to set aside the default and held that McGarvin-Moberly had failed
to establish "good cause" for its delay. 4
Plaintiffs filed a motion to bar McGarvin-Moberly from any further
participation in the action.'" The district court stated that it would allow
McGarvin-Moberly to fully participate in discovery and at the trial "on
issues concerning proximate cause and damages." 6 Plaintiffs moved for
reconsideration, and the court modified its order. 7 The new order allowed McGarvin-Moberly to fully participate in discovery and the trial
"solely on the issue of Plaintiffs' damages. " "

11. WYO. R. Civ. P. 55 reads in part:
(a) Entry- When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed
to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to appear by
affidavit or otherwise, the clerk shall enter the party's default.
(b) Judgment-Judgment by default may be entered as follows:
(1)...
(2) By the Court . . . If the party against whom a judgment by default is
sought has appeared in the action the party . . . shall be served with written
notice of the application for judgment at least three days prior to the hearing
on such application. If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to
carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine the
amount of damages . . . the court may conduct such hearings or order such
references as it deems necessary.
12. Welden's Response, supra note 8, at 9. There are several noteworthy differences between
default and a default judgment. Entry of default "is simply a clerical act performed by the clerk of
court which determines liability but not relief." Lee v. Sage Creek Refining Co., 876 P.2d 997
(Wyo. 1994). Default can be set aside "for good cause shown" and is not appealable. WYO. R. Civ.
P. 55 (c); Booth v. Magee Carpet Co., 548 P.2d 1252, 1255 (Wyo. 1976). See also CHARLES A.
WRIGHT Er AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2696 (1983) [hereinafter WRIGHT].

Default judgments can be entered by the clerk or the court, but only when damages ae for a sum
certain or made certain through a damages hearing. Courts require a higher stlandad which includes mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect to set aside default judgments. Wyo.R.Civ.P. 60(b). Default judgments, because of their finality, are appealable. See also Carl B. Schultz, Sanctioning Defendans' NonW7WIlDelay: The Failure of Rule 55 and a Proposalfor Its Reform, 23 U. RICH. L. REV. 203, 207-09
(1989)[hcreinafter Schultz]; Robert B. Sessums, Judgments-Rules 41, 54(b), 55, 57, 58, and 60, 52 MISS.
L.J. 171, 172-75 (1982) (comparing default and default judgment).
13. Welden's Response, supra note 8, at 9.
14. McGavin-Moberly, 897 P.2d at 1313. McGarvin-Moberly had given the complaint to its insurane company who misplaced it and as a result failed to respond. Welden's Response, supra note 8, at 10.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Welden's Response, supra note 8, at 14. This order was styled an "Order on Defendant
McGarvin-Moberly's Further Participation" (Oct. 26, 1993). Id.
18. McGarvin-Moberly, 897 P.2d at 1313.
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The plaintiffs and the defaulting defendant filed petitions for writ of
review with the Wyoming Supreme Court.19 The court granted the writs
and affirmed the district court's initial ruling.' ° The court stated that the
defaulting party should be permitted to participate on issues of both fault
and damages. 2' It found that under a comparative fault regime, damages
and fault are bound too closely together to allow a defendant to contest
one, but not the other.'
This casenote examines how this decision modifies the Wyoming
Supreme Court's past treatment of default. It also analyzes comparative
fault and its role in default situations. In doing so, it explores Wyoming
law as well as approaches adopted by other jurisdictions. Finally, the note
analyzes the potential negative consequences this decision may have on
the policy goals underlying the default rule and on its practical application
in Wyoming courts.
BACKGROUND

Rule 55 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure is modeled after
Fed. R. Civ. P. 55.2 Wyoming's rule allows the clerk of court to enter
default against a party who has failed to submit a timely responsive pleading. If the requested damages are unliquidated, Rule 55 requires the
court to hold hearings to determine the amount of damages rightfully
owed to the plaintiff before entering default judgment.' After determining
the damages, the court enters a default judgment binding the defaulting
party to the court's decree. 6
The Wyoming Supreme Court analyzed the policies behind Rule 55
in depth in Vanasse v. Ramsay. 3 In Vanasse, the court described default
judgment as a powerful tool for discouraging delay in the trial process.2

19. Id.
20. Id. at 1311.
21. Id.
22. McGarvin-Moberly, 897 P.2d at 1317. Although the case was remanded by the court, it
was settled before any further proceedings took place. Telephone Interview with C. Bradley Smith,
Counsel for Plaintiff Welden (Oct. 9, 1995).
23. Hopkinson v. State, 664 P.2d 43, 52 (Wyo. 1983). "[O]n July 2, 1957 ... the Wyoming
Rules of Civil Procedure, patterned after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, were adopted." Id.
24. Damages are liquidated only "when they are certain or, by computation, made certain."
Halberstam v. Cokeley, 872 P.2d 109, 113 (Wyo. 1994).
25. See supra note 11.
26. Id.
27. 847 P.2d 993 (Wyo. 1993); See also WRIGHT, supra note 12, § 2681 (analyzing the policies which underlie the federal rule).
28. Vanasse, 847 P.2d at 1000. See also Byrd v. Keene Corp., 104 F.R.D. 10, 11 (E.D.
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The threat of default ensures that defendants intending to defend the case
will answer in a timely manner.29 If a defendant fails to respond, either
through inadvertence or purposeful delay, default ensures that the toll
they exact from the process is paid with their own opportunity to defend.
The default mechanism is also essential for encouraging efficiency
and finality in litigation. Besides deterring late answers, Rule 55 precludes challenges to those issues deemed admitted by an entry of default.3
Among the most important admissions is liability.32 Entry of default
closes the issue of liability to further challenges by the defendant and
advances the case toward resolution.33
Because it denies litigants the opportunity to present their case,
default is often harsh.' As a result, "default judgments are not favored at
law . . . it is preferable that cases be tried on their merits. "35 With this in
mind, courts have allowed limited participation by defaulting parties who
indicate a desire to defend.36 The primary vehicle for this participation has
been the damages hearing provided for in Wyo. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). 37
Rule 55(b)(2) allows a court to establish the amount and degree of
relief by conducting a damages hearing prior to the entry of default judg-

Penn. 1984); H.F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 432 F.2d 689, 691
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (noting the importance of default judgment in discouraging delay in federal courts).
29. Vanasse, 847 P.2d at 1000.
30. Id. See also Carlson v. Carlson, 836 P.2d 297, 301 (Wyo. 1992).
31. Id. See also Zweifel v. State ex rel. Brimmer, 517 P.2d 493, 499 (Wyo. 1974) (ruling that
a defaulting defendant has no standing to challenge factual allegations of the plaintiff's claim).
32. Farrell v. Hursh Agency, Inc., 713 P.2d 1174, 1181 (Wyo. 1986). Vanasse, 847 P.2d
at 996-97. "[D]efault generally forecloses the party found to be in default from making any further defense or assertion with respect to liability or an asserted claim." Id. (quoting Spitzer v.
Spitzer, 777 P.2d 587, 592 (Wyo. 1989)).
33. Spitzer, 777 P.2d at 592. Default also performs some functions that are beyond the scope
of this note. It is regularly used as a sanction against those who ignore orders compelling discovery.
WYO. R. CIv. P. 37(b)(2)(C). See Zweifel, 517 P.2d at 498-99.
34. Spitzer, 777 P.2d at 592.
35. Carlson, 836 P.2d at 301. But see Vanasse, 847 P.2d at 1000 (holding that default is
becoming a more common sanction and is not perceived as being as drastic as it once was).
36. Farrell, 713 P.2d at 1179 (quoting Bankers Union Life Ins. Co. v. Fiocca, 532 P.2d
57. 58-59 (1975)). The court stated that the purpose of the notice requirement for the Rule 55
damages hearing, "is to protect those parties who, although delinquent in filing pleadings within
the time periods specified, have indicated a clear purpose to defend by entry of their appearance." Id. The notice provided for in WYO. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2), and the resulting participation
in the damages hearing is only afforded those defaulting parties who have appeared in the action
following the entry of default. Booth v. Magee Carpet Co., 548 P.2d 1252, 1254 (Wyo. 1976).
37. Farrell, 713 P.2d at 1179. See B. Finberg, Annotation, Defaulting Defendant's Right
to Notice and Hearing as to Determination of Amount of Damages, 15 A.L.R. 3d 586 (1967)
[hereinafter Finberg] (analyzing defaulting parties' right to participate in Rule 55 damages
hearing).
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ment.3" In cases of default where the damages are unliquidated the court
requires such a hearing." While the court has defined when a hearing is
needed, until McGarvin-Moberly, the court had never defined comparative
fault's role in that process.
Comparative Fault
Wyoming has had a comparative fault statute in one form or another
since 1973. 0 The Wyoming Legislature originally approved the comparative fault provision "to eliminate the unjust concept of common law contributory negligence.""' In 1986, a significant revision of the comparative
fault statute eliminated joint and several liability and limited joint
tortfeasors' liability to the percentage of fault individually attributed to
them.42
Wyoming has a modified comparative fault statute43 which allows
plaintiffs to collect damages so long as they are "not more than fifty
percent at fault."44 At the request of any party in an action, the fact finder

38. See supra note 11. While the court had ruled that default establishes liability, it had also
found that the amount and degree of relief remained undetermined following default. Spitzer, 777
P.2d at 592.
39. Melehes v. Wilson, 774 P.2d 573, 580 (Wyo. 1989); Midway Oil Corp. v. Guess, 714
P.2d 339, 345 (Wyo, 1986); Adel v.Parkhurst, 681 P.2d 886, 892 (Wyo. 1984). "The district court
shall conduct a hearing, take evidence and determine an amount of damages based on the evidence
presented." Melehes, 774 P.2d at 580.
40. Greg Greenlee & Ann M. Rochelle, ComparativeNegligence and Strict Tort Liability- The
MarriageRevisited, 22 LAND & WATER L. REV. 455, 469 (1987).
41. Kirby Bldg. Sys. v. Mineral Explorations, 704 P.2d 1266, 1275 (Wyo. 1985). An additional function of the comparative fault statute is to create an incentive to join all the parties involved
and generate greater judicial economy. Board of County Comm'rs of Campbell County v. Ridenour,
623 P.2d 1174, 1192 n.14 (Wyo. 1981).
42. Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-109 (1988). See also Schneider Nat'l Inc. v. Holland Hitch Co.. 843
P.2d 561, 569 (Wyo. 1992); James W. Owens Jr., Comment, The Availability of Indemnity In Tort
Actions Involving The Wyoming Comparative Negligence Statute-Multiple Parties Cause Multiple
Problems: A Comment on Schneider Nat'l, Inc. v. Holland Hitch Co., 29 LAND & WATER L. REV.
253 (1994) (providing an excellent review of recent changes in the comparative fault statute).
43. Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187, 192 (Wyo. 1979).
44. Wvo.STAT. § 1-1-109 (1988) states in part:
(a) Contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery in an action by any person ... if
contributory negligence of the said person is not more than fifty percent (50%) of the
total fault. Any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of
negligence attributed to the person recovering.
(b) The court may, and when requested by any party shall:
(i) If a jury trial:
(A) Direct the jury to find separate special verdicts determining the
total amount of damages and the percentage of fault attributable to
each actor whether or not a party.
(ii)...
(d) Each defendant is liable only for that proportion of the total dollar amount deter-
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must establish separate special verdicts."' One verdict determines the total
damages, and the other determines the proportion of fault attributable to
each of the actors.' The percentage of fault must be divided among all
actors, not just the parties to the legal action.47 The court then apportions
the damages according to those findings.4
Matching damages with the proportion of the defendant's fault has been
a prominent policy consideration encompassing the Wyoming Supreme
Court's approach to comparative fault.49 When ruling on the availability of
indemnification in comparative fault actions, the court adopted a theory of
comparative partial indemnity. 5° This approach ensures that indemnity liability "be allocated among the parties proportionately to their comparative degree of fault."'" The court found that matching fault and damages was fundamental to "the interest of attaining justice."52
The court has shown its commitment to matching fault and damages even when the results run contrary to common notions of justice. 53 When defining the effect of settlement agreements in comparative fault cases, the court found that non-settling defendants must pay a
share of the damage proportionate to their fault.54 The court arrived at
this conclusion despite creating a substantial windfall for the plaintiff.5 The court stated that "each defendant is liable only for the portion of the injury he caused not the whole injury; no two are liable for
the same injury."56

mined as damages ... in the percentage of the amount of fault attributed to him.
Though the format of this statute was substantially modified in 1994, the modifications do
not affect the analysis of this case. McGarvin-Moberly, 897 P.2d at 1316 n.2.
45. WYO. STAT. § 1-1-109(b).

46. Id.
47. Ridenour, 623 P.2d at 1188; Kirby Bldg. Sys., 704 P.2d at 1272. The court stated that
failing to account for non-parties would result in an inflated percentage of negligence for the defendants in an action. Id. at 1272-73.
48. Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-109(d).
49. Halliburton Co. v. McAdams, Roux & Assocs., 773 P.2d 153, 155 (Wyo. 1989). See
supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
50. Schneider Nat'l. Inc. v. Holland Hitch Co., 843 P.2d 561, 576 (Wyo. 1992).
51. Id. at 578. This contrasts sharply with the traditional notions of indemnification which
were governed by an all or nothing standard. Id. at 571-73.
52. Id. at 576.
53. See Haderlie v. Sondgeroth, 866 P.2d 703 (Wyo. 1993).
54. Id. at 710.
55. Id. In Haderlie, two of the three defendants settled for a total of $205,000. The non-setding defendant was found to be 100% responsible for the accident and was ordered to pay, $375,000
the full amount of damages. The plaintiff thus received a windfall of $205,000. Haderlie, 866 P.2d at

706-07.
56. Id. at 709.
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Until McGarvin-Moberly, the court had said very little about the
application of comparative fault in default situations. It had found Wyoming Statute section 1-1-109 to be a factor only when "a case is tried by
a jury or to the court and a party requests, or the court on its own, makes
a determination of the percentages of fault attributable to each [actor]." 5 7
If all the defendants in an action default and a court does not apportion
damages of its own volition, the court has ruled that joint and several
liability will apply."
The court seemed to take a stronger position in State Farm v.
Colley.5 9 In Colley, State Farm attempted to intervene in order to protect

its interests where one defendant had settled and one of its insureds had
defaulted.' State Farm argued that not allowing them into the case would
foreclose defenses like comparative negligence and prevent them from
protecting their interests . The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the
lower court's refusal of State Farm's intervention.62 Though no defendant
remained active in the case, the court ruled that the district court had an
"obligation

. .

.to make an allocation of damages after granting a judg-

ment by default."63 The court reasoned that although default established
the defendant's liability, "the apportionment of damages required by
Wyoming Statute section 1-1-109

. .

. [remained] to be determined."6

The Colley decision may have obscured when comparative fault should
apply in default situations, but it made one thing clear: default alone does
not remove a case from the purview of the comparative fault statute.
Other Jurisdictions
Prior to McGarvin-Moberly, the Wyoming Supreme Court decided
that comparative fault would apply to some cases of default, but said
nothing about the defaulting party's participation in the apportionment of
fault.' Though no jurisdictions have dealt with the application of compar-

57. Melehes, 774 P.2d at 580.
58. Id. The court is currently facing this issue again. Brief of Appellee D.A. Stinger Servs.
Inc. at 19, Olsten Staffing Servs. Inc. v. D.A. Stinger Services Inc. (Wyo. Oct. 13. 1995) (No. 95197, 95-198) (defaulting defendants appeared before entry of default judgment, but the district court

did not allow them to challenge or apportion fault).
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
Melehes.
64.
65.

871 P.2d 191 (Wyo. 1994).
Id. at 193.
Id. at 196.
Id. at 198.
Id. at 196. In making this ruling the court did not draw a distinction between Colley and
In fact, the court did not mention Melehes in its decision. Id.
Id.
See McGarvin-Moberly's Petition, supra note 3, at 20.
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ative fault where a defendant has appeared between default and default
judgment, several have addressed its application following a judgment by
default. These courts have predominantly decided not only to bar defaulting defendants from challenging issues of fault, but to totally prohibit the
use of comparative fault.'
In Whitby v. Maloy, 67 the Georgia Court of Appeals addressed a case
in which one of three defendants defaulted. The court found that the
defendant, by way of default, had admitted negligence and every other
material allegation except for the amount of damages.' As a result, the
defaulting defendant could challenge damages, but no other issue.69 The
court went on to say that because comparative fault goes to the right of
recovery it is "not available to the defendant in default even though...
[it] may also go to the assessment of damages." 7'
The New Mexico Court of Appeals came to the same conclusion in
Passino v. Cascade Steel Fabricators,Inc.7 The New Mexico Court held
that liability is not an issue and apportionment of fault is not available
once a court enters default against a defendant.' Passino involved two
defendants. One of the defendants answered as required, but settled the
case before trial." The other defendant failed to answer and the court
entered default judgment against him.7 The court said that "by defaulting,
defendant has waived its rights to the application of comparative negligence and apportionment of damages."'" It held that "any other holding
would seriously weaken, and could even abolish the efficacy of default
judgments. "76

66. See infra text accompanying notes 67-97.
67. 258 S.E.2d 181 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979).
68. Id. at 182.
69. Id.at 183. See also Adkisson v. Huffman, 469 S.W.2d 368, 375 (Tenn. 1971) (ruling that
the defaulting defendant cannot challenge plaintiffs contributory negligence because all material
allegations are admitted as a result of the default). Adkisson uses the term contributory negligence to
signify the apportionment of liability between the defendant and the plaintiff. Kuhn v. Harless, 390
So. 2d 721, 722 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
70. Whitby, 258 S.E.2d at 182-83. While not directly addressing the applicability of comparative fault, the Michigan court of appeals showed similar reasoning when they said, "[o]nce default is
established the defendant loses his standing to contest the factual allegations of the plaintiff's claim for
relief.- Akron Contracting Co. v. Oakland County, 310 N.W.2d 874, 877 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
71. 734 P.2d 235 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987).
72. Id. at 237.
73. Id. at 236.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 237. But see Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Wilson, 725 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1987) (affirming instructions to the jury allowing them to apportion fault between a defaulting
party and the remaining defendants, but not reaching the issue of whether a defaulting party could
participate in any of the proceedings).
76. Passino, 743 P.2d at 237.
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In Kuhn v. Harless,77 a Florida court considered whether a defendant
could challenge fault when default was applied as a sanction for violating
discovery orders. 78 The Florida Court of Appeals held that "comparative
negligence is a defense to an allegation of liability." 79 Once liability is admitted by the entry of default, a defaulting defendant cannot use comparative
fault to challenge it. 80 When the question was appealed, the Florida Supreme
Court held that a trial court has discretion to allow this type of participation
when default is used as a discovery sanction."' The court, however, found
that a different rule applies when the defendant suffers a default for failure to
plead.' In these cases defendants have "the right to contest damages caused
by [their] own wrong but no other issue.""
Though the majority of courts have rejected the use of comparative fault
in default situations at least one jurisdiction, Ohio, has chosen a sharply
contrasting approach. In Jordan v. Elex Inc.,' the trial court found that the
defendant had failed to "answer or otherwise defend."' Consequently, the
court entered default judgment against the defendant on the issue of liability,
but not on the issue of damages.' The court went on to find that the defense
of comparative fault was still available and that even the issues of foreseeability and proximate cause remained at issue following the default. The
appellate court accepted these findings in their totality allowing the defaulting
party to utilize comparative fault as a defense.'
FederalLaw
Many federal courts have held that only damages remain at issue in
cases of default. These courts found that default concedes "all well pleaded allegations of liability. "' The courts reasoned that allowing a default-

77. 390 So. 2d 721 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
78. Id. See 6 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE

55.02[4] (2d ed.

1995) (analyzing the differences between a default order sanctioning violation of court orders and
default for failure to plead).
79. Kuhn, 390 So. 2d at 722.
80. Id.
81. Harless v. Kuhn, 403 So. 2d 423, 425 (Fla. 1981).
82.

Id. at 425.

83. Id. See also Thomas v. Duquesne Light Co., 545 A.2d 289 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (ruling
that comparative negligence, while it relates to damages, is a "substantive defense" and cannot be
used by a defaulting defendant).

84. 611 N.E.2d 852 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
85. Id. at 855.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Greyhound Exibitgroup v. E.L.U.L. Realty, 973 F.2d 155, 158 (2nd Cir. 1992); Brockton
Say. Bank v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 771 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1985); Nishimatsu Constr. Co.,
Ltd., v. Houston Nat'l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1975).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1996

9

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 31 [1996], Iss. 2, Art. 17

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXXI

ing defendant to contest comparative fault would permit a defendant to
"effectively contest settled issues of liability
[undermining] the gener9
al policy governing default."
Federal courts have not, however, taken a completely uniform approach to this issue. For example, in Fehlhaber v. Indian Trail Inc.,9' the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed a case where a thirdparty defendant had defaulted. 9 The third-party plaintiff urged the court
not to apportion negligence but instead to hold the defaulting party responsible for the full measure of damages.9 The court focused on
Delaware's contribution statute which required the court to apportion
negligence among the responsible parties.93 It held that default only establishes liability. 4 "The degree of their fault

. .

.[goes] to the extent of the

95

defendant's damages." As a result, the court allowed the defaulting
party to challenge fault in the Rule 55 damages hearing and apportioned
damages between the third-party plaintiff and the third party defendant.9
Both the language and the reasoning of this case corresponded closely
with that of the principal case. 7
PRINCIPAL CASE

McGarvin-Moberly Construction v. Welden marks the Wyoming
Supreme Court's first detailed decision regarding default's role under the
state's comparative fault provision.98 The majority opinion allowed a
defaulting defendant to participate in litigation on issues of fault. 9 Justice
Cardine wrote a dissenting opinion that criticized the majority for undermining the effect of default and its incentives." He instead argued that
the court could read the comparative fault and default provisions in concert while maintaining default's full effect.'
89. Greyhound, 973 F.2d at 159.
90. 425 F.2d 715 (3rd Cir. 1970).
91.

Id. at 716.

92. Id.
93. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 6302(d) (1974) states, "[wihen there is such a disproportion of

fault among joint tort-feasors as to render inequitable an equal distribution among them of the common liability by contribution, the relative degrees of fault of the joint tort-feasors shall be considered
in determining their pro rata shares."
94. Fehlhaber,425 F.2d at 717.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. McGarvin-Moberly, 897 P.2d at 1314.
98. Id. at 1311.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1319.
101. Id. at 1317.
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The majority began its opinion by endorsing the traditional notions
of default encompassed by both Vanasse and Spitzer.1 It acknowledged
that default maintains "a reasonably high standard of diligence in observing the courts' rules of procedure."t 3 The court was, however, quick to
draw a distinction between the entry of default and default judgment." °
Chief among these distinctions was that default judgment acts as a final
judgment, but an entry of default leaves open the issue of unliquidated
damages."t Out of this difference the court derived the right for a defaulting party to challenge issues of both fault and damages.
The majority first outlined the defaulting party's right to participate
in the damages hearing provided for under Wyo.R.CiV.P. 55(b)(2).106
The court found that the notice requirement provided for in Rule 55
would be void of meaning absent the defaulting party's ability to participate." In addition, it found that if defendants were truly to participate in
hearings, they should have the opportunity to challenge the issue of fault
as well as damages.'0o Although the holding was somewhat revolutionary,
the court carefully limited its decision to cases where default is entered
against a defendant, but the defendant appears prior to default judgment."°
According to the majority, the commands of Wyoming Statute
section 1-1-109(d) (1988) support this new doctrine."' The majority
found that denying McGarvin-Moberly the opportunity to contest fault
would "deprive [it] of the statutory formula" provided for under this
provision."' The degree of relief to be determined after an entry of
default" 2 necessarily includes the amount of fault attributable to each

102. Id. at 1313-14. These included default's role in spurring litigation to a conclusion and its
utility in encouraging compliance with the Rules of Civil Procedure. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
103.

McGarvin-Moberly, 897 P.2d at 1314.

104. Id. at 1313.
105. Id. See supra note 38. The court also noted that an appearance after the entry of default
entitles the defaulting party to the notice required by Rule 55, while appearance after default judgment
does not. McGarvin-Moberly, 897 P.2d at 1315.

106. See supra note 11. The majority cited cases from no fewer than nineteen jurisdictions to
validate its finding. McGarvin-Moberly 819 P.2d at 1315.
107. McGarvin-Moberly, 897 P.2d at 1315. See also WRIGHT, supra note 12, § 2687; Finberg,
supra note 37, § 3; Farrell,713 P.2d at 1179.
108. McGarvin-Moberly, 897 P.2d at 1316.
109. Id. "Our sole concern in this case is the degree of participation . . . that should be afforded to a defendant . . . when default, but no judgment by default has been entered against that defendant." Id. at 1311.
110. Id. See supra note 44.
111.

McGarvin-Moberly, 897 P.2d at 1316.
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actor.' The court reasoned that under the comparative fault regime
adopted in Wyoming, "the question of fault is inextricably intertwined
with the amount of damages that may be awarded against any defendant.""" The inseparable nature of damages and fault suggested that if
a defendant were not allowed to defend on the issue of fault, his participation in the damages hearing would be less than complete." 5
The court also based its opinion on considerations of fairness.' 16 It
reasoned that limiting a defaulting party to participation on damages only,
17
might result in compensation for a plaintiff who is more than 50% at fault.
The court found this result to not only contravene section 1-1-109, but common sense as well." 8 In addition, the court feared that non-defaulting defendants might collaborate with plaintiffs in order to hoist responsibility for
damages upon the defaulting defendant.1 9 Finally, the court held that the
sense of fairness reflected in its other comparative fault decisions" would be
compromised if the defendant were not allowed to challenge fault.'
Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion by Justice Cardine argued that denying a defaulting defendant the full benefits of section 1-1-109 is not only acceptable, but
implements the policies embodied in the default rule. In the dissent's view,
other defendants blaming the defaulting party for the full measure of damages, or plaintiffs recovering damages though they are more than 50% at fault
are simply "the detriment resulting from default."" 2 It argued the court had
failed to read Wyo. R. Civ. P. 55 and Wyoming Statute section 1-1-109 in
harmony, and in the process undennined the "reasonable and understood
effect of default. " "
113. Id. But see Whitby, supra note 67 (holding that comparative negligence goes to die right of
recovery and cannot be raised in a default case even though it may also go to the assessment of dam-

ages).
114. McGarvin-Moberly, 897 P.2d at 1317.
115. Id.
116. Id.

117. Id. The application of the comparative fault statute even without participation by the defaulting defendant would prevent this. Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-109(a). This statement indicates that the
court limited its options to either allowing the defaulting party to participate or refusing application of
the comparative fault statute altogether. Id. See Passino, supra note 71 (ruling that default puts a
party outside the purview of comparative fault).
118. McGarvin-Moberly, 897 P.2d at 1317.

119.
defaulting
note 3, at
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 1317. The danger of this type of collaboration increases in cases like this where the
party is the one with the most financial resources. McGarvin-Moberly's Petition, supra
23.
See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
McGarvin-Moberly, 897 P.2d at 1317.
Id. at 1319.

123. Id.
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To support its position, the dissent attacked two of the majority's
principal findings. First, it challenged the majority's ruling that a defaulting defendant does not admit fault. In Vanasse the court stated that an
entry of default is equal to admitting liability." The majority in
McGarvin-Moberly reconciled its decisions by stating that an entry of
default admits liability, but not fault."5 The dissent countered that liability
is an umbrella term which includes fault.' 26 It went on to say that "in the
context of a personal injury claim, [fault and liability are] not distinguishable at all."" The dissent criticized the majority for subverting the precedent established in Vanasse. If the majority was going to overturn prior
cases, the dissent admonished, "it should so state in clear and unequivocal

language.,128
Second, the dissent challenged the majority's characterization of
damages and fault as being "intertwined."129 It maintained that the language of Wyoming's comparative fault statute clearly indicates that damages and fault can and should be considered separately." 3 It pointed to
Wyoming Statute section 1-1-109 which states that a jury should separate
verdicts to find the total amount of damages and the percentage of fault
attributable to each actor. 3' It then cited the Wyoming Pattern Jury Instructions developed to carry out this command.' 32 The dissent contended
the ability to
that provisions governing comparative fault indicate not 13only
3
separate damages and fault, but a clear policy to do so.
The dissent concluded that the defaulting party should not be allowed to challenge fault, but should instead be placed on the verdict form
and treated similar to a non-party in the action.t" In Cardine's view the
majority approach placed a defaulting party in a "defensive posture as
and abolished the incenfavorable as though default had never occurred"
35
tives stemming from the use of default. 1
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Vanasse, 847 P.2d at 1000.
McGarvin-Moberly, 897 P.2d at 1315.
Id. at 1318.
Id.
Id. at 1319.
See supra note 114 and accompanying text.

130. McGarvin-Moberly, 897 P.2d at 1319.

131. See supra note 44.
132. See WYOMING PATIERN JURY INSTRUCIONS (Rev. 1993), Rule 10.04. This instruction established a two stage process. In stage one, the jury apportions fault among the parties. In stage two,
the jury determines the total amount of damages "without considering the percentage of fault." Id.
133. McGarvin-Moberly, 897 P.2d at 1319.
134. Id. The treatment would differ in some respects because, unlike a non-party, the defaulting
party would be bound by the judgment. County Comm'rs of Campbell County v. Ridenour, 623 P.2d
1174, 1188 (Wyo. 1981).

135. McGarvin-Moberly, 897 P.2d at 1319.
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ANALYSIS

In McGarvin-Moberly, the court's desire for fairness impeded its
duty to promote efficiency in the court. The result was a revolutionary
decision'36 wandering far from the path followed by most other jurisdictions; a decision that undermines both the integrity of the court's prior
decisions and the effectiveness of default under Rule 55.
Lack of Authority
In rendering its decision, the court provided remarkably little
authority for its conclusions. In support of its core holding the court
cited only two cases. One was a case from the Eastern District of New
York finding that a defaulting defendant should be allowed to conduct
"discovery regarding the amount of unliquidated damages." 137 The
other was a United States Supreme Court case holding that, in multiple
defendant cases, a court should not impose default judgment until the
case is tried against the defendants not in default.' 3
The dissent suggested that the conspicuous absence of on-point case
law may "indicate no one has heretofore even seriously suggested that any
court would allow a defendant in default to defend fault contrary to the
language of decided cases." 3 9 Where parties have suggested the application of comparative fault in cases of default, the weight of authority is
clearly contrary to the findings in McGarvin-Moberly. "

136. See John W.R. Murray, Defendant Defaults; May Avoid Paying Any Damages at All, 95
LAWYERS WEEKLY USA 744, 757(1995) [hereinafter Murray].
137. Clague v. Bednarski, 105 F.R.D. 552, 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (quoted with approval in
McGarvin-Moberly, 897 P.2d at 1316).
138. Frow v. De La Vega, 82 U.S. 552, 554 (1872) (cited with approval in McGarvin-Moberly,
897 P.2d at 1316). The courts main concern was a possibility of inconsistent judgments. It is interesting to note that the Frow court goes on to say the trial should proceed based upon the answers of the
other defendant because the defaulting party has "lost his standing in court." Id.
At the circuit court level, the Frow decision has been limited to cases resulting in joint liability. Some courts have ruled it inapplicable in cases where they apply joint and several liability or
comparative fault, because the chance for inconsistent judgments not as great. In re Uranium Antitrust
Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1257 (7th Cir. 1980). See also Wright, supra note 12, § 2690.
139. McGarvin-Moberly, 897 P.2d at 1319.
140. See supra notes 67-89 and accompanying text. But see Fehlhaber, 425 F.2d at 715;
Jordan, 611 N.E.2d at 852. Though the cases conflicting with McGarvin-Moberly deal with default judgments, their reasoning is also applicable to cases where only default has been entered.
These cases hold that comparative fault does not apply to default because liability has already
been determined and comparative fault is a defense to liability. Liability is uncontestable whether default or default judgment has been entered. Spitzer, 777 P.2d at 592; Vanasse, 847 P.2d at
1000.
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Decisions lacking authority are expected when courts rule on a blank
slate, but this was not such a case. This decision tacitly overruled impor14
tant principles that have guided the court's use of default for years. '
Despite the carefully phrased arguments that the majority employs, they
are allowing the defendant to assert a defense to liability.' 42
The court has historically characterized liability as the legal responsibility emanating from fault. 43 The whole impetus behind comparative
fault was to create a closer relationship between fault and liability. " If
any two principles are "inextricably intertwined" they are fault and liability not the clearly separable issues of fault and damages. With the 1986
amendments to Wyoming Statute section 1-1-109, the legislature created a
direct correlation between fault and liability,"'4 To permit a challenge to
one and say you are not permitting a challenge to both is to let semantics
overcome reason. Allowing a defaulting party to contest fault is in essence allowing them to assert a "further defense

. . .

with respect to

liability" contrary to the holdings in Spitzer and Vanasse.Y
The Demise of Default
Perhaps the greatest weakness of this decision is that it frustrates the
operation of default. Historically default has been a powerful tool, allowing courts to usher litigation to a speedy conclusion despite a party who
fails to answer in a timely manner. 47 Under McGarvin-Moberly, defaulting defendants who appear before default judgment can revive issues of
fault that before would have been laid to rest by an entry of default. "
The majority indicated that default retains consequences regardless of the
defendant's ability to challenge fault. They stated that a defaulting party
still cannot implead others or argue that it is negligence-free. 49 Though
141. McGarvin-Moberly, 897 P.2d at 1319.
142. Id. See Colley, 871 P.2d at 196 (characterizing comparative negligence as a defense).
143. See Eiselein v. K-Mart, 868 P.2d 893, 896 (Wyo. 1994) (describing the purpose of comparative fault as distributing liability on the basis of causal fault); Allmaras v. Mudge, 820 P.2d 533,
542 (Wyo. 1991) (finding that liability results from fault even in some cases of intervening negligence).
144. Halliburton, 773 P.2d at 155. See ALAN D. BUDMAN Er AL., COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
§ 1.30[1] (1990).
145. Eiselein, 868 P.2d at 896. See Greenlee & Rochelle, supra note 40, at 469; WYOMING
PATrERN JURY INSTRUcTION (Rev. 1993), Rule 10.03. "Each defendant's liability is limited by the
percentage of fault ... that you find is attributable to that particular defendant." Id.
146. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
147. Vanasse, 847 P.2d at 1000; Greyhound, 973 F.2d at 159. See Schultz, supra note 12, at
203-05.
148. Murray, supra note 136, at 744.
149. McGarvin-Moberly, 897 P.2d at 1317.
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this may impose some efficiency in trial proceedings, it falls far short of
that achieved by barring challenges to fault.150 With this decision the court
has transformed default from an agent of efficiency into a foundation for
additional delay.
Alternatives

Treating the defaulting defendant similar to a non-party is a sensible
option for these types of cases.'' Using this approach, a court could
bifurcate the proceeding, holding one hearing on the issue of fault and
liability, and another on the amount of damages. The court would place
the defaulting defendant on the verdict form without allowing them to participate on issues of fault. It would then permit the defendant to contest
the amount of total damages in the second hearing. Applied in McGarvinMoberly, this approach would allow the defaulting defendant to challenge
the existence and severity of the Weldens' injuries but no more.'52 This
alternative would leave the application of default untethered while ensuring that courts would comply with the spirit of the comparative fault
statute.
As the majority indicated, if a defaulting party was not allowed to
challenge fault, other parties might try to shift responsibility to defaulting defendants with deep pockets.' If a court determined this situation was inequitable, it could exercise the discretion provided in
Rule 55 to overcome it.' 54 A court could remove the entry of default," 5
and allow a defendant to participate as a party and contest all aspects
150. Because the defaulting party still has the power to challenge the degree of negligence, the
court gains little efficiency by instructing the jury that the defaulting defendant is negligent. Likewise,
the efficiency gained by barring the defaulting party from impleading others is largely illusionary.
Though this allows the court to avoid counter and cross-claims that an additional party could bring,
the requirement that all parties be placed on the verdict form necessarily means that the litigants will
continue to contest the negligence of those not in the action. See Ridenour, 623 P.2d at 1188; Kirby
Bldg. Sys., 704 P.2d at 1272.
151. This is the option that Justice Cardine proposes in his dissent. McGarvin-Moberly, 897
P.2d at 1319. See Kirby Bldg. Sys, 704 P.2d at 1272; Ridenour, 623 P.2d at 1188-89 (illustrating the
treatment of non-parties in comparative fault cases).
152. McGarvin-Moberly asserted that the absence of physical damage to the Weldens' car, and
the fact that the plaintiffs did not request any medical assistance at the scene of the accidents indicated
that they were not injured at all. See McGarvin-Moberly's Petition, supra note 3, at 4-5. This is the
type of evidence Justice Cardine's approach would allow the defaulting party to present.
153. McGarvin-Moberly, 897 P.2d at 1317.
154. Claassen v. Nord, 756 P.2d 189 (Wyo. 1988); Zweifel v. State 517 P.2d 493, 498 (Wyo.
1974). But see Vanasse, 847 P.2d at 1000 (making an analogy between the imposition of default and
a statute of limitation saying: "They are not judicially made but represent legislative and public policy
controlling the right to litigate ... courts have no right to deny their application.").
155. Claassen, 756 P.2d at 193.
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of the case. 5 6 The decision in McGarvin-Moberly has removed much
of this discretion. Challenging fault has ceased to be a privilege for
parties who respond promptly, or for courts to grant when justice
demands, and has become an undeniable right."5 7
Absent the dramatic step of setting aside an entry of default, the
system itself would contain protection for the defaulting party. The jury's
final determination of fault, while influenced by the facts given, is still
limited to what the participating parties can prove.' The demands of the
judicial system would not allow parties to create a case out of whole-cloth
in order to pin responsibility on a defaulting defendant. Despite these protections a defaulting party would be disadvantaged by their default. The
measure of true justice, however, may be that parties who respond
promptly are rewarded for their vigilance, and those who harm the system
through delay are forced to pay for that harm.
CONCLUSION

The Wyoming Supreme Court's decision to allow a defaulting defendant, who has appeared prior to the entry of judgment, to participate in
litigation on the issue of fault is suspect both in respect to precedent and in
respect to public policy. Though the court came to what it viewed as a just
conclusion, it did so at great cost. This decision significantly undermines both
precedent and default's role in promoting efficiency in litigation.
A better approach would have been to treat the defaulting defendant
similar to a non-party. This would allow the courts to stay true to the
letter and spirit of the comparative fault statute while ensuring that default
continued to encourage efficiency in litigation.
TIMOTHY M. STUBSON

156. Another option, beyond the scope of this note, is to create alternatives to default as sanctions for failure to plead. Schultz. supra note 147, at 226. Alternatives could include mandatory
awards of costs and expenses to the non-defaulting party. Id.
157. McGarvin-Moberly, 897 P.2d at 1316.
158. DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643, 652 (Wyo. 1986). "Negligence and proximate cause are
never presumed from the happening of an accident, and mere conjecture cannot form the basis of
liability." Id.
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